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7.1   Introduction
Korea entered an aging society as of 2000, when people over age sixty- fi ve 
made up 7.2 percent of the population. The ratio of the elderly population in 
Korea is projected to reach 14.3 percent by 2018 before it becomes a super-
 aged society in 2026, with the share reaching 20.8 percent. Consequently, 
the elderly dependency ratio, which is defi ned as people aged sixty- fi ve and 
over per people aged fi fteen to sixty- four years, is projected to increase three 
times from 12.6 percent in 2005 to 37.7 percent in 2030, according to the 
Korea National Statistical Oﬃce.
In spite of its population aging at an unprecedented pace in the world, 
Korea has been unsuccessful in building up a social safety net for the elderly. 
Instead, adult children (mostly eldest sons) have undertaken the responsi-
bilities of supporting their elderly parents in Korea’s extended family. For 
this reason, empirical analysis of the fi nancial support given to elderly par-
ents by adult children is important in preparing an income guarantee policy 
that suits the current trend of the population aging and its subsequent social 
and economic changes.
Even though a substantial portion of  Korean elderly have been living 
on fi nancial assistance received from their children, studies on intergen-
erational transfers in Korea are rare and microeconomic empirical studies 
are even rarer. Part of the reason for this is there had been few microdata 
on intergenerational transfers until the twenty- fi rst century. Now we have 
such data from at least three data sets: the Korean Labor and Income Panel 
Study (KLIPS), the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging (KLoSA), and the 
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Korean Retirement and Income Study (KReIS). This study examines micro-
economic behavior on intergenerational transfers using these data sets.
First of all, this study directly looks into variables regarding intergenera-
tional transfers in the three Korean data sets and compares them with those 
in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), one of the elderly panel data sets 
that the KLoSA and the KReIS have tried to benchmark. Compared with 
the author’s previous paper (Kim 2006) that uses data from the KLIPS, this 
study has both similarity and complementarity. The previous study analyzes 
a broad range of issues on private transfers—such as the magnitude and 
frequency of transfers, the determinants of transfer receipts and gifts, the 
crowding out of private transfers by public transfers, and the dead zones 
and loopholes of public assistance—and, therefore, some issues certainly 
overlap with this study. If  we fi nd similar results regarding the patterns and 
motivations of intergenerational transfers from these diﬀerent data sets, we 
may get closer to stylized facts with the fi ndings. Therefore, I cite or mention 
selected results from the previous study in some places of this chapter.
At the same time, however, this study deals with some unexplored issues 
using new features of the KLoSA and the KReIS data. First, the KLoSA 
respondents report their transfer receipts and gifts with all adult children 
who do not live with them. This resultant sibling sample motivates family 
fi xed- eﬀect models to examine which child gives more transfers to elderly 
parents or lives with them.
Second, the KReIS data report intergenerational transfers between par-
ents and coresident children as well as between parents and noncoresident 
children. Considering that intergenerational transfers are reported only for 
noncoresident adult children in other data sets, we can have an unusual 
opportunity to examine intergenerational transfers by children’s coresidence 
status and conjecture the motivations of those transfers.
Third, the KReIS survey has explicit questions on the existence of grand-
children who respondents and/ or spouses are taking care of, the hours of 
caregiving, and the magnitude of pecuniary compensation, if  any. These 
data items enable us to directly test whether there exists an exchange motive 
in adult children’s cash transfers to their parents who look after grand-
children.
Fourth, the KLoSA survey asks about the respondents’ subjective expec-
tation feelings to several issues: for instance, the fi nancial situation in their 
future, the relative fi nancial situation of their children’s generation com-
pared to their own generation, and potential support for their old age by 
government. I use these variables to examine how individuals’ expectations 
on tomorrow’s situations aﬀect their transfer behavior today.
Finally, the KLoSA and the KReIS data contain information on inheri-
tances and detailed items of assets and debts. Using these variables that have 
rarely been observed in other data sets, this study fi rst documents some basic 
statistics on inheritance and wealth in Korea.
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This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7.2 quantifi es intergenerational 
transfers focusing on adult children’s transfers given to their elderly parents. 
Section 7.3 examines the characteristics of the donor and the recipient of 
such transfers to uncover which parents benefi t more from their children and 
which child in the family gives more to the parents. Section 7.4 documents 
ongoing changes in familial support mechanism and suggests policy impli-
cations for old- age income security, based on observed profi les of income 
and wealth by age and by income quintile. The last section concludes.
7.2   Patterns of Intergenerational Transfers
In this section, I tabulate descriptive statistics on intergenerational trans-
fers in Korea, and then those in the United States as well, for a cross- country 
comparison. First, I examine “inter- vivos” transfers; that is, transfers made 
while both the donor and the recipient are alive. Then, I look at reported 
and expected inheritance as another way that intergenerational transfers 
are made.
7.2.1   Inter- Vivos Transfers
First, I describe inter- vivos transfers in Korea, observed in the KLoSA, 
the KLIPS, and KReIS data sets focusing on adult children’s fi nancial help 
given to their elderly parents. The HRS data show striking diﬀerences in 
intergenerational transfer patterns between the United States and Korea.
KLoSA Data
The Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging (KLoSA) started in 2006 for the 
purpose of creating a basic data set needed to devise and implement eﬀective 
policies to population aging.1 The KLoSA survey interviews middle/ old-
 aged population (aged forty- fi ve or older) nationwide, excluding Jeju Island. 
The total number of samples is 10,254 in 2006. Topics under KLoSA are 
grouped into the following seven main categories: (a) Demographics; (b) 
Family; (c) Health; (d) Employment; (e) Income; (f ) Assets; (g) Subjective 
Expectations and Satisfaction.2
Specifi cally, rich information on intergenerational transfers in the Family 
section is extremely useful for this study. In the 2006 KLoSA data, fi nancial 
transfers between the respondent and each child during the last calendar 
year (2005) are asked if  the child does not live with the respondent. Accord-
ing to the KLoSA questionnaire, fi nancial help (or transfer) means giving 
1. Basic survey for KLoSA will be conducted every even- numbered year starting from 2006, 
mostly using the same survey categories. The fi rst KLoSA baseline survey was conducted over 
a six- month period from July 2006. The surveys thereafter will also be held in the second half  
of the year.
2. The data and questionnaires of the 2006 KLoSA are available online at the website of 
Korea Labor Institute (www.kli.re.kr).
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money, helping pay bills, or covering specifi c types of costs (such as those 
for medical care or insurance, schooling, down payment for a home, rent, 
etc.), but it does not count any shared housing or shared food. Respondents 
are told that fi nancial help can be considered as either a gift or a loan. The 
survey separately reports transfers made on a regular basis and those made 
irregularly. Regular monetary transfer refers to the case in which respon-
dents received monetary transfers regularly in a certain time interval (e.g., 
each month, every two months), such as monthly allowances. Occasional (or 
irregular) monetary transfer refers to the case in which respondents received 
monetary transfers without any regularity, such as paying for medical bills 
or schooling and occasional allowances. I calculate annual regular transfer 
amount by multiplying the average amount of regular transfer by the num-
ber of months such transfer is made.
Intergenerational transfers in the KLoSA survey are reported not only 
for survey respondents and their children but also for the respondents and 
their own parents. The later generation data on the respondents and their 
children will be used in the main analyses of this study. The average age of 
parents (i.e., respondents) is 69.5, and that of their children is 41.5. In the 
earlier generation data on the respondents and their parents, the average age 
of respondents who have at least one living parent is 52.3, and their fathers 
and mothers are, on average, 79.1 and 78.8 years old, respectively.3 I add up 
fi nancial assistance given to and received from the father and the mother 
if  they are both alive. We have observations on intergenerational transfers 
made in 6,496 families for the later generation and those made in 3,159 
families for the earlier generation.
Table 7.1 reports descriptive statistics on annual intergenerational trans-
fers for each generation. Forty percent of  respondents received fi nancial 
transfers from their children and 11.4 percent gave fi nancial help to their 
children. Average receipt amount is 1,040,000 won and average gift amount 
is 850,000 won, which yields average net transfer receipt of  190,000 won 
(surplus) for parents.
Looking at the earlier generation, 41.5 percent of respondents gave fi nan-
cial help to their elderly parents and 6 percent received fi nancial support 
from them. Mean amount (both conditional and unconditional one) of net 
transfer is larger—more than double—for the earlier generation than for the 
later generation. Note that the former measures average net transfer received 
only from respondents, excluding those from their siblings, but the latter 
measures average net transfer received from all children of the respondents. 
Taking this diﬀerent survey structure into account, the smaller amount of 
average net transfer receipt for the parents in the later generation may refl ect 
a weakening role of children’s fi nancial support for their old parents. Other-
3. Given that at least one parent is alive, the fraction of the father’s being alive is 0.323 and 
that of the mother’s is 0.932.
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wise, it may refl ect that the relative fi nancial situation of parents to their 
children in the later generation is better than that in the earlier generation. 
Or, instead, it may simply refl ect age diﬀerence between the parents in the 
two generations. At least the last conjecture seems to be supported by table 
7.2. Net transfer receipt from children increases with the respondents’ age 
from their fi fties to early seventies. As parents get older, they are more likely 
to receive a large net transfer.4
Table 7.1 Annual intergenerational transfers in Korea: KLoSA data 
(%, 10,000 won)
Conditional 
on making 
each transfer
    
Fraction 
(%)  
Unconditional 
mean  Mean  Median
Later generation (6,496 families)
From children (A) Regular 10.6 65 615 360
Irregular 35.3 39 111 60
Totala 40.1 104 260 100
To children (B) Regular 5.0 54 1,079 720
Irregular 7.4 31 419 50
Totala 11.4 85 749 315
Net transfer receipt Regularb 15.1 11 71 240
 from children (A – B) Irregularb 38.9 8 21 50
Totalb 46.3 19 41 70
Earlier generation (3,159 families)
To parents (C) Regular 10.2 42 413 240
Irregular 31.7 19 59 40
Totala 41.5 61 147 50
From parents (D) Regular 0.7 1 82 12
Irregular 5.4 14 267 30
Totala 6.1 15 247 30
Net transfer gift to Regularc 10.8 41 383 234
 parents (C – D) Irregularc 35.6 4 12 30
  Totalc  45.8  46  100  50
Source: Calculated by the author, using the 2006 KLoSA data.
Note: All numbers are calculated using weights assigned to family respondents.
aEither regular or irregular, or both transfers are made.
bEither from or to children, or both, some transfers are made.
cEither to or from parents, or both, some transfers are made.
4. Another possibility is a measurement error. In particular, we might need to account for 
potential underreporting bias when the respondents are asked to report their transfer receipts as 
opposed to their transfer gifts (see Gale and Scholz [1994] and Brown and Weisbenner [2002] for 
this bias). If  KLoSA respondents indeed underreported transfers from their children (A) and/ or 
from their parents (D), net transfer receipt from their children (A– B) should be underestimated 
and/ or net transfer gift to their parents (C– D) should be overestimated in table 7.1.
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In addition, table 7.2 shows that the direction of the net fl ow of inter-
generational transfers is reversed from downward to upward around the 
parent’s age sixty, a common retirement age. Transfer receipt from children 
increases as respondents get older, peaking at their mid- seventies, while 
transfer gift to children decreases after their fi fties. Although these profi les 
are constructed from cross- section data, they probably depict a life cycle 
reallocation through intergenerational transfers within Korean families.
KLIPS Data
The Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) is an annual survey 
of 5,000 households and their members (aged fi fteen and over) from the 
seven metropolitan cities and urban areas in eight provinces (excluding Jeju 
Island).5 Since its fourth- year survey in 2001, the KLIPS has been collect-
ing data on intergenerational transfers given to and received from parents. 
Related questions are separately asked for the household head’s parents and 
for the spouse’s parents. Using these questions, we know fi nancial transfers 
in the last year given to and received from parents and parents- in- law who 
do not live with respondents and spouses. The average age of the KLIPS 
household heads is 45.4 in 2005.
Table 7.3 shows that at least 50 percent of KLIPS households make trans-
fers to their parents or parents- in- law; however, the fraction of households 
who report transfer receipts from their parents or parents- in- law is at most 
24 percent. Compared with the KLoSA data in table 7.1, the KLIPS data 
Table 7.2 Mean amount of annual intergenerational transfer in Korea by age: KLoSA data 
(10,000 won)
Respondent age (no. of families)
45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–
  (1,128)  (840)  (789)  (809)  (953)  (785)  (1,192)
From children (A) Regular 5 18 49 67 134 162 115
Irregular 7 13 30 57 70 71 65
Totala 12 31 79 124 204 233 180
To children (B) Regular 98 129 49 28 13 4 1
Irregular 34 23 51 49 22 21 3
Totala 132 152 100 77 35 25 5
Net transfer receipt from Regularb –93 –111 1 39 121 159 113
 children (A–B) Irregularb –28 –10 –21 8 49 49 61
  Totalb  –120  –121  –20  47  170  208  175
Source: Calculated by the author, using the 2006 KLoSA data.
Note: All numbers are calculated using weights assigned to family respondents.
aEither regular or irregular, or both transfers are made.
bEither from or to children, or both, some transfers are made.
5. The data and documentations of the KLIPS can be downloaded at the website of Korea 
Labor Institute (www.kli.re.kr).
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report more prevalent, sizable transfers between parents and children. But it 
should be accounted for that the intergenerational transfers from the KLIPS 
data in table 7.3 include fi nancial help from/ to the spouses’ parents as well as 
the household heads’ parents, whereas those from the KLoSA data in table 
7.1 do not include transfers from/ to parents- in- law. In addition, unlike the 
KLoSA survey, the intergenerational transfers in the KLIPS survey include 
monetary value of in- kind transfers such as food or electronic appliances 
(evaluated at the purchase price).6
By its survey structure, the KLIPS provides an opportunity to investigate 
potential diﬀerences between transfers from/ to the husband’s parents and 
those from/ to the wife’s parents by separating them using information on the 
household head’s gender.7 Table 7.4 reveals that Korean households tend to 
give a larger amount of transfers (in terms of both average and median) to 
the husband’s parents than to the wife’s parents. As for the median amount 
of transfer gifts from parents, however, we do not observe such diﬀerences 
between the head’s parents and the wife’s parents. This gender diﬀerence 
might refl ect asymmetric standings of  the husband and the wife in their 
earnings and decision- making powers in the family. But it surely refl ects 
traditional norms under which elderly parents have been supported mainly 
by their sons (especially their eldest sons) rather than their daughters.
KReIS Data
The Korean Retirement and Income Study (KReIS) started in 2005 to be 
conducted every odd- numbered year. The KReIS survey has the purpose 
of creating a basic data set needed to devise policies for eﬀective old- age 
income security. The sample consists of  nationally representative 5,110 
households that have at least one person aged fi fty or older (an “age- eligible 
respondent”). In addition, the KReIS included the age- eligible respondent’s 
spouse irrespective of his/ her age, resulting in a total sample of 8,689 respon-
dents.
In the 2005 KReIS data, private transfers received by and given by the 
respondent or the spouse during the last calendar year (2004) are asked. 
Unlike the KLoSA and the KLIPS data, the KReIS reports transfers be-
tween the respondent (or the spouse) and coresident family members as well 
as noncoresident family members. According to the KReIS questionnaire, 
transfers include fi nancial help in the form of money or in- kind transfers 
for living, schooling, and so forth, but do not include occasional gifts such 
as for birthdays or holidays.
6. By contrast, the KLoSA survey asked about in- kind transfers using separate questions 
on “nonmonetary” transfer. Suggested types of nonmonetary support in the questionnaire is 
leisure (e.g., travel), health- related products (e.g., vitamins, equipments, etc.), household items, 
electronics, dining out and foods, and other. But their monetary values are not reported.
7. The proportion of females among the KLIPS household heads has increased gradually: 
15.3 percent in 2001, 16.0 percent in 2002, 18.0 percent in 2003, 18.3 percent in 2004, and 19.6 
percent in 2005.
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Since private transfers are reported for every age- eligible respondent 
or spouse in the household, some households have multiple observations 
of diﬀerent amounts of transfers when there are multiple respondents or 
couples in the same household. Thus, I specify a “fi nancial respondent” for 
each household by naming the household head fi rst, and then the spouse 
if  the head is not a respondent, and then the head’s parent if  both are not 
respondents, and so on following the frequency of the respondent’s relation-
ship with the head in the data. The resulting age- eligible fi nancial respon-
dents, who were aged 64.9 on average in 2005, provide 4,800 household 
observations on private transfers.
Table 7.5 tabulates annual transfer receipts and gifts by the relationship of 
donors and recipients. The proportion of those who received transfers from 
noncoresident children is 45.8 percent, while that from coresident children 
is 16.5 percent. Because coresidence is another important way of support-
ing elderly parents and also because some coresident children may be still 
dependent on their parents, fewer coresident children tend to give transfers 
to their parents than their noncoresident siblings. The mean amount of 
transfer receipt from noncoresident children is 1,380,000 won and the con-
ditional mean (median) amount is 3,010,000 (1,500,000) won.
The proportion of respondents who gave transfers to coresident children 
is 23.8 percent and the conditional mean (median) amount of transfer gift 
is 7,300,000 (6,000,000) won. This sizable amount may refl ect parents’ help 
for dependent children (e.g., college tuition help) who are relatively young 
compared to noncoresident children. In terms of mean amounts of trans-
fer receipt and gift, coresident children tend to be “net receivers” whereas 
noncoresident children tend to be “net givers” from whom parents receive 
950,000 ( 1,380,000 – 430,000) won, on average, a year.
Time is also transferable between family members through informal care-
givings. Given that family caregivings are substitutes for formal caregivings 
that can be purchased from the market in many cases, intergenerational 
caregivings often have similar eﬀects on the recipient with intergenerational 
fi nancial help. Specifi cally, the KReIS data report respondents’ childcare 
for their grandchildren and caregivings for their sick parents. As Table 
7.6 shows, about 15 percent of age- eligible fi nancial respondents or their 
spouses are currently looking after their grandchildren almost entirely, and 
their average (median) child care hours are fi fty- four (forty- nine) hours a 
week—the equivalent of having a full- time job with no weekend and holi-
day. At the same time, 15 percent of grandparents said that they had an expe-
rience of quitting paid work or reducing the amount of time they worked 
in order to look after their grandchildren. Of those who provide child care 
services, two- thirds oﬀer their services for free. The rest receive money with 
mean (median) amounts 360,000 (300,000) won a month, which suggests 
that some intergenerational transfers from adult children to elderly parents 
are motivated by an exchange motive—child care service for money.
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On the other hand, 7 percent of age- eligible fi nancial respondents or their 
spouses are currently taking care of  their sick parents and their average 
(median) caregiving hours are thirty- seven (twenty- one) hours a week. 
About 26 percent had an experience of quitting paid work or reducing the 
amount of time they worked in order to care for their sick parents.
Intergenerational Transfers in the United States: HRS Data
Now let us look at comparative data for the United States on intergen-
erational transfers. Among others, the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
provides useful information on fi nancial transfers between parents and chil-
dren. The HRS is a national panel study with an initial sample of  7,607 
households (12,652 persons who were fi fty- one to sixty- one years old in 
1992).8 To compare annual familial transfers between the United States and 
Korea, I use the fi rst two waves of the HRS (1992, 1994) that report inter-
generational transfers made in the past twelve months.9 The 1992 wave of 
the HRS asked about fi nancial assistance given to the parents and children 
of the respondent or spouse totaling 500 dollars or more in the past twelve 
months.10 In the 1994 wave, the censoring amount was changed to 100 dol-
lars, and fi nancial assistance received from their parents and children was 
also reported.
Panel A and panel B in table 7.7 report the 1992/ 1994 HRS respondents’ 
transfer gifts to their parents or parents- in- law and those to their children, 
respectively. Both waves of the HRS data show that the respondents make 
Table 7.6 Family caregivings in Korea: KReIS data
Caregivings for  
Grandchildren 
(N  3,290 households 
that have grandchildren)  
Sick parents 
(N  1,431 households 
whose parents are alive)
Proportion of caregiving households 14.7% 7.0%
Mean (median) caregiving hours per week 54 (49) hours 37 (21) hours
Proportion of caregivers who had to quit 
 or reduce work for caregiving 15.2% 26.3%
Proportion of caregivers who receive money 
 for caregiving 33.2% n.a.
Mean (median) amount of money received 
 for caregiving per month  360,000 (300,000) won  n.a.
Source: Calculated by the author, using the 2005 KReIS data.
Note: All numbers are weighted using household weights.
8. The baseline 1992 survey consisted of in- home, face- to- face interviews with the 1931 to 
1941 birth cohort and their spouses, if  married. Follow- up interviews were given by telephone 
in 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006.
9. In waves 3 through 8 the questions on fi nancial transfers asked about transfers exceeding 
$500 in the past two years.
10. The fi nancial help in the HRS data includes help with education but it does not include 
any shared housing or shared food, which is the same as the KLoSA data.
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substantial transfers to their children, whereas transfers to their elderly par-
ents are much fewer. Panel C and panel D report the 1994 HRS respondents’ 
transfer receipts from their parents or parents- in- law and those from their 
children. The fraction of positive transfer receipts is very low from both 
directions.
To compare Koreans’ transfers to their elderly parents with Americans,’ 
we should pay attention to the 1994 HRS statistics in panel A, which are 
fairly comparable to the KLIPS statistics in table 7.3. Remember that KLIPS 
respondents are on average younger than HRS respondents, and therefore 
take the 2005 KLIPS statistics from table 7.3. About 62 percent of Korean 
households give some transfers to their parents or parents- in- law, and the 
average amount of transfers conditional on gift is 1,964,000 won (roughly 
$2,000 in 2005 dollars) a year. By contrast, only 16.5 percent of American 
households make transfers to their parents or parents- in- law, and the 
average transfer amount conditional on gift is just $117 (converted to 2005 
dollars) a year.
Using later waves of the HRS, we can also see similar patterns of U.S. 
familial transfers, which are mostly headed for children and play only a 
limited role as a supplemental income for the elderly. Table 7.8 shows the 
fraction of U.S. households making intergenerational transfers exceeding 
500 dollars in the last two years over six waves of the HRS survey fi elded in 
1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006.11 The proportion of families who 
Table 7.7 Annual intergenerational transfers in the United States: HRS 1992/1994 
data (U.S. dollar in each year)
Data (censoring amount)  Fraction % (N)  
Unconditional 
mean  
Conditional 
mean  
Conditional 
median
A. To parents or parents- in- law
HRS 1992 ($500 or more) 10.8 (2,180) 208 1,929 1,000
HRS 1994 ($100 or more) 16.5 (1,985) 89 903 500
B. to children
HRS 1992 ($500 or more) 34.8 (3,920) 1,604 4,609 2,000
HRS 1994 ($100 or more) 45.1 (3,462) 1,750 3,934 1,400
C. From parents or parents- in- law
HRS 1994 ($100 or more) 5.7 (1,984) 81 2,459 1,000
D. From children
HRS 1994 ($100 or more)  8.0 (3,465)  90  1,505  600
Source: Calculated by the author, using the 1992/1994 HRS data.
Note: All numbers are weighted using household weights of each wave.
11. The HRS sample was expanded in 1998, and every two years thereafter, by adding the 
Study of Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) sample and the new 
subsamples—War Babies (WB) and Children of the Depression (CODA)—to the original HRS 
sample interviewed previously in 1992, 1994, and 1996. Therefore, the number of households 
that responded to transfer questions increased substantially in 1998.
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gave positive transfers to children is always over 30 percent, which is more 
than double the proportion of families who gave positive transfers to elderly 
parents.
Compared to Korean families in tables 7.1, 7.3, and 7.5, among which at 
least 40 percent give transfers to elderly parents in the last twelve months, 
fewer American families make such transfers, at most 17 percent, even in the 
last twenty- four months. This may refl ect a cultural diﬀerence between two 
countries in that Korea has a tradition of extended families and Confucian 
ethics that requires children’s responsibility of supporting their elders. But 
it may also refl ect that even without help from children, American elderly 
can have relatively suﬃcient income from their savings or Social Security 
benefi ts.12
Also, unlike Korean families who exhibit noticeable gender diﬀerences 
in transfer behavior toward the husband’s parents and the wife’s parents 
(table 7.4), American families in the HRS data do not clearly show such 
diﬀerences. The 1996 wave of the HRS reports fi nancial assistance from/ to 
parents and parents- in- law separately. I identify the husband’s parents and 
the wife’s parents based on the family respondent’s gender. The fraction of 
households who made transfers to the wife’s parents is 14 percent, similar 
to the fraction of 15 percent for the husband’s parents.13
Table 7.8 Fraction of U.S. households making intergenerational transfers exceeding 
500 dollars in the last two years (% positive fraction [no. of households])
Data  
To children or 
grandchildren  
From children 
or grandchildren  
To parents or 
parents- in- law  
From parents or 
parents- in- law
HRS 1996 39.9 (6,208) 4.0 (6,224) Husband’s parents: 
15.0 (1,930)
Husband’s parents: 
4.4 (1,940)
Wife’s parents: 
13.9 (2,960)
Wife’s parents: 
6.0 (2,961)
HRS 1998 35.6 (12,764) 5.2 (12,802) 13.5 (3,900) 7.2 (3,902)
HRS 2000 35.7 (11,859) 5.9 (11,878) 15.3 (3,374) 7.1 (3,372)
HRS 2002 31.3 (12,038) 6.2 (12,049) 14.3 (4,299) 5.6 (4,307)
HRS 2004 37.9 (12,281) 6.5 (12,315) 16.7 (5,859) 6.9 (5,856)
HRS 2006  36.3 (11,494)  6.4 (11,521)  17.0 (4,742)  6.6 (4,741)
12. For instance, the sources of  American elderly household income as of  1984 for the 
highest and lowest income quintiles are as follows (Hurd 1990, table 12). The highest quintile 
households’ average income of $34,061 consists of  $9,450 earnings (27.2 percent), $13,289 
property income (39.0 percent), $5,901 Social Security benefi ts (17.3 percent), and $5,421 other 
income (15.9 percent). The lowest quintile households’ average income of $3,986 consists of 
$73 earnings (1.8 percent), $168 property income (4.2 percent), $3,102 Social Security benefi ts 
(77.8 percent), and $643 other income (16.1 percent). These amounts are in 1982 dollars and 
adjusted for family size.
13. The conditional mean (median) amount of positive transfer given to the husband’s par-
ents is $3,406 ($1,500) and that from the wife’s parents is $2,639 ($1,000). The conditional mean 
(median) amount of positive transfer received from the husband’s parents is $5,370 ($2,000) 
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7.2.2   Inheritances
Inheritances Ever Received
The 2006 KLoSA survey asks about money or property that the respon-
dent has ever received in the form of an inheritance, a trust fund, or an 
insurance settlement. As shown in table 7.9, the fraction of KLoSA house-
holds who have ever received any of these is only 2.4 percent.14 However, the 
magnitude of inheritance is quite sizable. The mean and median amounts 
of inheritances conditional on receipt are about 151 million won ($158,000) 
and 50 million won ($52,000), respectively.
The 1992 HRS survey contains a similar question on inheritance receipt, 
which reads: “Have you [or your (husband/ wife/ partner)] ever received an 
inheritance, or been given substantial assets in the form of a trust?”15 The 
fraction of HRS households who have ever received an inheritance is 28 
percent. The mean and median amounts of  inheritances conditional on 
receipt are about $51,000 and $20,000, respectively.
Considering diﬀerent age distributions of the 2006 KLoSA (age forty-
 fi ve or over) and the 1992 HRS (age fi fty- one to sixty- one) respondents, in 
the middle row of table 7.9, I restrict the KLoSA sample to those who were 
and that from the wife’s parents is $6,334 ($3,000). So if  I were to point out anything at all, the 
wife’s parents appear to receive slightly less and give slightly more than the husband’s parents 
in the United States.
14. To compare with the HRS data that report inheritances that the respondent or spouse 
has ever received, I add up a couple’s inheritance receipts if  both are KLoSA respondents and 
therefore both report their inheritances. But if  the spouse is not an eligible KLoSA respondent 
(probably because younger than forty- fi ve years old), her or his inheritance receipt cannot be 
counted in.
15. The 1992 HRS data report the following three receipts separately: (a) an inheritance or 
a trust; (b) money or assets totaling $10,000 or more; and (c) a life insurance settlement of 
$10,000 or more. I add up these three forms of receipts and fi nd that among 7,538 respondents 
the number of people with zero, one, two, and three forms of receipts is 5,420, 1,908, 203, and 
7, respectively.
Table 7.9 Inheritances ever received: KLoSA and HRS data
Data sample (no. of households)  
Percentage of the 
households that 
have ever inherited  
Mean amount 
conditional on 
receipt  
Median amount 
conditional on 
receipt
KLoSA 2006 2.4 W150,658,000 W50,000,000
 All households (N  6,171) ($157,665 in 2006) ($52,325 in 2006)
KLoSA 2006 3.3 W201,659,000 W80,000,000
 Age 51–61 cohort (N  1,781) ($211,038 in 2006) ($83,721 in 2006)
HRS 1992 28.1 $50,818 $20,000
 Age 51–61 cohort (N  7,538)   ($73,021 in 2006)  ($28,738 in 2006)
Notes: In converting won (W) to dollar ($) amount, I use the year- average exchange rate in 2006 (1 dollar 
 955.56 won) from the Bank of Korea. The 1992 dollar amounts are converted to the 2006 dollars using 
the Consumer Price Index.
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aged between fi fty- one and sixty- one at the time of survey. Compared to 
the whole KLoSA sample, this subsample reports a higher fraction of posi-
tive receipts and a larger conditional mean and median. Nevertheless, there 
still exists a sharp contrast between the HRS and the KLoSA in inheritance 
patterns.
According to the table, Korean parents tend to concentrate their bequests 
on a child (arguably the eldest son who has taken care of them in their old 
age), which limits the number of inheritors to a small fraction but increases 
the amount of inheritance. On the contrary, American parents are known 
to distribute their estates almost equally among their children.16
In light of this, we may infer that, together with traditional norms of fi lial 
piety, potential bequests could have been used as leverage for Korean parents 
to get old- age support from their children, or their eldest sons to be more 
specifi c. A cross- cultural study by Shin, Cho, and Walker (1997) also fi nds 
that Korean children and their parents (specifi cally, mothers and mothers-
 in- law in their study) are more likely to endorse distributing larger shares 
of  inheritance to the child who cares for her/ his parents than American 
counterparts.
The KLoSA data also report the form of the largest inheritance receipt 
and the relationship of  its donor to the recipient. Table 7.10 shows that 
about 70 percent of donors are recipients’ fathers, which may refl ect that 
the household head has the ownership of major household properties like a 
house. The form of the largest amount of inheritance is real estates in most 
cases. This implies that the most common case of inheritance in Korea is 
the eldest son’s inheriting his parents’ house or land when they died, fi nish-
ing their coresidence with him. The eldest son is more likely to stay with his 
elderly parents after marriage than any other child in the family (see table 
7.18 in section 7.4). Therefore, Korean parents have been able to provide a 
material incentive for the child who takes care of them in old age (mostly the 
eldest son) using their house as a promising inheritance.
The KReIS data report inheritances that respondents and spouses have 
ever received and bequests that they have ever left. Table 7.11 shows that 
28.6 percent of the age- eligible fi nancial respondents’ households received 
inheritances, which is a much larger proportion compared to the KLoSA 
households in table 7.9, but quite similar to the HRS households. This dis-
crepancy between the KReIS data and the KLoSA data in terms of  the 
fraction of households receiving inheritances may arise at least in part from 
the fact that these two data sets use diﬀerent wordings in their questions on 
inheritance. The KReIS asks about inheritances received by the spouse as 
well as the respondent, and explicitly refers to land or a house—the most 
16. For example, Wilhelm (1996) fi nds that 68.6 percent of decedents divide their estates 
exactly equally between their children, and 76.6 percent divide their estates so that each child 
receives within 2 percent of the average inheritance across all children. McGarry (1999) also 
fi nds that bequests are mostly shared equally, whereas inter- vivo transfers tend to be more 
compensatory.
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common form of inheritances in Korea. Looking at bequests that the KReIS 
respondents and spouses have ever left, we can fi nd that the tradition of 
primogeniture still prevails but diﬀerent patterns also make an appearance. 
The proportion of the eldest son as the main recipient of bequests is 52.6, 
still more than half, but the proportion of equal distribution across children 
is now the second most frequent case.
Expectation about Inheritances
While having not yet received any inheritance, people may expect to re-
ceive inheritances in the future. They may also expect to leave bequests. The 
KLoSA and the HRS surveys have questions on subjective expectations 
about inheritances.17 Table 7.12 reports such expectations. The sample mean 
of the subjective chances that the KLoSA respondents will receive inheri-
Table 7.10 Who leaves what as an inheritance in Korea? KLoSA data
Relationship of donor  No. of cases (%)  Form of inheritance  No. of cases (%)
Father 99 (67.8) Real estate 137 (93.8)
Spouse 28 (19.2) Cash or fi nancial assets 5 (3.4)
Mother 12 (8.2) Insurance settlement 2 (1.4)
Father- in- law or mother- in- law 4 (2.7) Pension settlement 1 (0.7)
Other relative 3 (2.1) Other 1 (0.7)
Total  146 (100.0)  Total  146 (100.0)
Table 7.11 Inheritances and bequests in Korea: KReIS data (N  4,800 households)
Inheritances ever received Bequests ever left
Proportion of recipients (%)  28.6  Proportion of donors (%)  31.7
Donor  % donora  Main recipient  % main recipient
Parents
Parents- in- law
Grandparents
Grandparents- in- law
 79.3
Eldest son
Evenly to every child
Eldest daughter
Noneldest son
52.6
17.6
15.5
9.3
Spouse (deceased) 21.1 Noneldest daughter 3.5
Social organization 0.6
    Sibling  0.1
Source: Calculated by the author, using the 2005 KReIS data.
Note: All numbers are weighted using household weights.
aThe sum of “% donor” is 100.4 because a few households received inheritances from both 
their parents and their spouses.
17. The related KLoSA questions read: “Including property and other valuables that 
you might own, what are the chances that you will leave an inheritance totaling 100,000,000 
Korean won or more? And how about the chances that you will receive an inheritance totaling 
100,000,000 Korean won or more?” The corresponding HRS questions read: “What are the 
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tances exceeding 100,000,000 won is 0.17, which is much higher than the 
fraction of the KLoSA households that have ever inherited in table 7.9. This 
subjective probability is quite comparable to the HRS respondents’ expecta-
tions in table 7.12, although the HRS questions did not give any censoring 
amount (herein a lower limit) to the respondents. Therefore, the KLoSA 
respondents appear to have more optimistic expectations about substan-
tial amounts of inheritance receipts than the HRS respondents. As for the 
subjective probability of leaving an inheritance exceeding 100,000,000 won 
(roughly $100,000 in 2006), the KLoSA respondents report 0.38 on average 
and the corresponding HRS fi gures range from 0.42 to 0.48.
Considering substantial diﬀerences between the KLoSA and the HRS 
in terms of inheritance receipts, their expectations about inheritances seem 
fairly similar to each other. This probably suggests that Koreans’ behav-
iors toward inheritances are getting closer to Americans’. That is, Koreans’ 
bequests are being more equally distributed among children, as the eldest 
son’s burden of supporting elderly parents is being distributed to a broader 
range of supporters, including other sons, daughters, and parents themselves 
(see table 7.19 in section 7.4). Incidentally, high chances that Koreans expect 
to leave sizable inheritances exceeding 100,000,000 won might refl ect the 
recent housing market boom in Korea, considering that the most common 
form of their inheritance is real estate.
7.3   Characteristics of Donor and Recipient
Intergenerational transfers given by adult children to their elderly parents 
have played a crucial role in the old- age income security in Korea. As shown 
in the previous section, Korean elderly parents are more likely to be net ben-
Table 7.12 Subjective expectations about inheritances: KLoSA and HRS data
Data  Chances of receiving an inheritance  Chances of leaving a bequest
KLoSA 2006 W100,000,000 or more: 0.17 (N  3,163) W100,000,000 or more: 0.38 (N  10,254)
HRS 1994 0.21 (N  5,905) $10,000 or more: 0.60 (N  5,901)
Mean (median) amount: $51,127 ($20,000) $100,000 or more: 0.42 (N  5,139)
HRS 1996 0.20 (N  6,316) $10,000 or more: 0.65 (N  6,309)
Mean (median) amount: $62,996 ($25,000) $100,000 or more: 0.44 (N  4,885)
HRS 1998 0.18 (N  6,027) $10,000 or more: 0.65 (N  6,000)
Mean (median) amount: $75,220 ($25,000) $100,000 or more: 0.45 (N  4,778)
HRS 2000 0.17 (N  5,697) $10,000 or more: 0.66 (N  5,660)
  Mean (median) amount: $172,661 ($20,000) $100,000 or more: 0.48 (N  4,563)
chances that you [or your (husband/ wife/ partner)] will leave an inheritance totaling $10,000 
[$100,000] or more? And how about the chances that you will receive an inheritance within the 
next 10 years? About how large do you expect that inheritance to be?”
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efi ciaries in fi nancial exchanges with their children. This section investigates 
the characteristics of the donor and the recipient to better understand the 
motivation and other realities of familial transfers in Korea.
First, I introduce a simple model of intergenerational transfers for setting 
up a basic specifi cation of empirical models and review existing empirical 
results. Based on these backgrounds, I examine parents’ characteristics as the 
explanatory variables in the regressions of the parents’ net transfer receipt 
from their children. Then I examine children’s characteristics using family 
fi xed- eﬀect models to fi gure out which child will provide the largest fi nancial 
help, which is what many parents are probably curious about.
7.3.1   Background
The theoretical framework in this section is adopted from Cox, Hansen, 
and Jimenez (2004). Consider a family in which fi nancial transfers are made 
between two family members. For simplicity, I assume that the “net giver” 
whose transfer gift is bigger than transfer receipt has an altruistic preference, 
while the “net receiver” does not. So the two family members are assumed 
to consist of an altruistic donor and a nonaltruistic recipient.
Suppose the utility of the donor, Ud, is given by:
(1) Ud  U(Cd, s, V(Cr, s)),
where V is the well- being of the recipient; Cd and Cr are consumption levels 
for the donor and the recipient, respectively; and s denotes “services” that 
the recipient might provide to the donor.18 The donor’s altruistic motive is 
indicated by U/ V  0. Exchange motives may be present as well if  the 
donor values services from the recipient, U/ s  0, and the recipient’s utility 
falls with provision of services, V/ s  0.
The budget constraints for donor and recipient can be written:
(2) Cd  Id  T and Cr  Ir  T,
where T denotes fi nancial transfers given by the donor to the recipient; and 
Id and Ir are pretransfer incomes of the donor and the recipient, respectively. 
Since Cr is a normal good for the donor, transfers are increasing in the 
donor’s pretransfer income, T/ Id  0.
If  transfers are altruistically motivated, we expect T/ Ir  0 because 
the donor believes that the recipient with higher (lower) pretransfer income 
requires smaller (larger) transfers to attain the optimal level of consumption. 
Instead, if  transfers are exchange- motivated, the relationship between T and 
Ir will be ambiguous. Suppose transfers are payments for services that the 
18. Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (2004) consider “services” as a catchall term standing for 
anything provided by the recipient in return for the money received from the donor. It can be, 
for example, help with home production, babysitting, visiting, caregiving, behaving in a way 
the donor prefers, or future fi nancial transfers as the discounted value of repayments if  the 
money received from the donor is a loan.
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donor purchases from the recipient at an implicit price, p, so that T  ps. Cox 
(1987) shows s/ Ir  0 and p/ Ir  0; that is, a richer recipient will provide 
smaller services to the donor, and the donor has to pay a higher price for the 
services provided by a richer recipient. Therefore, transfers can rise or fall 
with Ir, depending on whether the price eﬀect dominates the quantity eﬀect. 
In this case, the functional form of transfers in the recipient’s pretransfer 
income will be nonlinear.
As seen in the previous section, the dominant direction of private transfers 
in the United States is downward; therefore, most empirical studies using 
U.S. data focus on the motivation of  parental transfers to their children 
rather than adult children’s transfers to their elderly parents. The extensive 
empirical literature comes to mixed conclusions on whether inter- vivos trans-
fers are compensatory or not. McGarry and Schoeni (1995, 1997), Dunn 
and Phillips (1997), McGarry (1999, 2000), and Hochguertel and Ohlsson 
(2000), for example, report that parental transfers compensate worse- oﬀ 
children. But Laferrère and Wolﬀ (2004) discuss some empirical studies 
providing evidence against compensatory transfers and rejecting altruism. 
Cox (1987), Cox and Rank (1992), and Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1998) also 
suggest that transfers may represent payment to the recipient for the provi-
sion of services rather than altruism. Cox and Jakubson (1995) even argue 
that the anti- poverty eﬀectiveness of public transfers can be magnifi ed by 
private- transfer responses that are basically exchange- motivated.
By contrast, the direction of familial transfers observed in Korean data 
sets is more likely to be upward; as a result, this study has a diﬀerent angle. 
In the remaining parts of this section, I estimate the familial transfer model 
in which adult children are net givers and their elderly parents are net receiv-
ers. If  children’s transfers are made in a compensatory fashion from their 
altruistic motive, an increase in their parents’ pretransfer income, for ex-
ample, by public assistance leads to a decrease in their transfers to the par-
ents. This altruism story and resultant crowding- out of  private transfers 
by public transfers are supported in Korean empirical studies by Kang and 
Jeon (2005) and Kim (2006). But Jin (1999) and Sung (2006) do not fi nd 
such evidence.
7.3.2   Which Parents Benefi t More from Children?
Here I examine parental characteristics as explanatory variables for net 
transfer receipt from children. The regression results using data from the 
KLoSA and the KReIS are provided in turn.
KLoSA Regression Results
In the 2006 KLoSA data, fi nancial transfers received from and given to 
each child in 2005 are reported by the respondent of the Children section 
in the survey. Regular transfers and irregular (or occasional) transfers are 
added up to construct total transfers. I calculate net total annual transfer 
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receipt from each child by subtracting total annual transfer gift to the child 
from total annual transfer receipt from the child. Then I sum up net total 
annual transfer receipt from every child of the respondent to generate the 
sum of net total annual transfer receipt of the respondent as the dependent 
variable.
The simple model discussed previously provides some guidance to the 
empirical specifi cations of transfer functions. First, as long as we do not 
know the motivation of transfers ex ante, the functional form of transfers 
needs to be nonlinear in the recipient’s pretransfer income. After trying 
polynomials of the third and the fourth order that turned out inappropriate 
in criteria of statistical signifi cance, I choose a quadratic function. Second, 
considering heterogeneous budget constraints depending on household 
characteristics given pretransfer incomes, I control for the recipient’s age, 
gender, family size, education level, wealth, health status, work status, and 
region of residence. Third, in order to account for diﬀerential numbers of 
donors in a family, we need to control for the number of children of the 
respondent; I further control for the number of daughters and sons sepa-
rately to address potential gender diﬀerences in supporting elderly parents. 
Finally, I attempt to address other observed characteristics that might aﬀect 
transfer behavior, such as religious preference, the number of grandchildren, 
expectations about fi nancial situation of recipients and their children, and ex-
pectations about public support for their old age.
Baseline regression results are reported in columns (a) and (b) of table 
7.13. First, transfer surplus (i.e., the sum of net total annual transfer receipt 
from every adult child in the family) increases with the recipient’s age until 
the late seventies, and then decreases. Remember that a similar pattern is 
also found in the transfer in/ out profi les by parent age in table 7.2. Female 
respondents report more transfer surplus from their children, conditional 
on their marital status.
Second, transfer surplus is negatively correlated with the recipient’s income 
for almost the entire range of their income distribution. The recipient’s net 
worth also reduces transfer surplus. These results clearly show the main 
motivation of familial transfers in Korea—an altruistic motive to alleviate 
the recipient’s fi nancial diﬃculties.19
Third, the son provides bigger fi nancial help to the parents than the 
daughter. The parameter estimates for the number of sons and the number 
of daughters in column (a) suggest that one more son gives his parents addi-
tional transfer surplus of 346,000 won while one more daughter gives her 
19. As mentioned earlier, using the KLIPS data, Kim (2006) also concludes that private 
transfers are altruistically motivated in Korea, from fi ndings that private transfer receipts 
are negatively correlated with the recipient income and they are crowded out by public assis-
tance. Moreover, Kim (2006) fi nds qualitatively similar results when both the donor’s and the 
recipient’s characteristics, including their incomes, are controlled for using a split- oﬀ children 
sample.
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parents additional transfer surplus of 143,000 won. When the number of the 
recipient’s grandchildren is included in the set of explanatory variables as 
in column (b), the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients for the number of sons 
and the number of  daughters are reduced signifi cantly so that one more 
daughter, in particular, does not increase transfer surplus anymore. There-
fore, one may imagine that the motivation of daughters’ fi nancial transfers 
to their elderly parents is closely related to their children (e.g., in return for 
grandparents’ babysitting service).
Fourth, parental education level increases transfer surplus until nine years 
of completed schooling (high school entrance level), but further parental 
education decreases transfer surplus. This nonlinear relationship between 
parental education and net transfers from children probably refl ects the 
fact that parental education delivers indirect information on their children’s 
economic standings. If  undereducated parents tend to have low- income chil-
dren, parents’ additional education implies their children’s higher income 
that can increase net transfers from the children to some levels of parental 
education. But highly educated parents may not need fi nancial help from 
their children or are even able to give net transfers to their children, so 
parental education eventually decreases transfer surplus from a certain level 
of their education.20
Fifth, those who live in the Metropolitan area (Seoul, Incheon, and 
 Gyeonggi province) report a larger transfer surplus than those in other 
provinces, which probably refl ects the recipient’s higher living cost and/ or 
the donor’s higher income in that area. More transfer surplus seems to go to 
divorced parents and those who reported their health status as poor. Other 
parental characteristics such as work status and religious preference do not 
aﬀect transfer surplus to a degree that has statistical signifi cance.
Furthermore, the KLoSA data contain survey results on respondents’ 
subjective expectation feelings to several issues. Among others, I select their 
expectations about the fi nancial situation in their future, the relative fi nan-
cial situation of their children’s generation compared to theirs, and potential 
support of  their old age by government. These expectations are rescaled 
between 0 and 1 with an interval of 0.1 and additionally included in the set 
of explanatory variables in columns (c) and (d) to see how they are correlated 
with familial transfer behavior.
The results show that expectations on tomorrow’s situations aﬀect today’s 
transfer behavior. Those who expect their children’s generation will be bet-
ter oﬀ than their generation tend to have more transfer surplus than those 
20. The KLoSA data contain detailed information on the respondents’ formal education—
the highest level of school they attended and whether they got the diploma, just completed 
course of study, dropped out, or passed an equivalency test. Using these variables, I construct 
a variable of imputed years of education that is used in the regressions. According to this vari-
able, the KLoSA respondents have 8.2 years of schooling on average, and 62.5 percent have 
education levels of nine years or below.
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who do not expect it. They probably make fewer transfers to their children 
or receive more transfers from their children, who may have similar expecta-
tions. A pessimistic expectation about their future fi nancial situation might 
also yield transfer surplus, but the relationship is not statistically signifi cant. 
So an expectation about the relative fi nancial situation of the respondents 
to their children seems more important than an expectation about the abso-
lute level of their own fi nancial situation in determining transfer balance 
between them.
The most interesting part would be the eﬀect of  an expectation about 
public support on private transfer behavior. The result suggests that those 
who expect that government will provide old- age support have smaller trans-
fer surplus within their families. They probably make more transfers to their 
children or receive fewer transfers from their children, who may have similar 
expectations. As long as familial transfers are not observed by government 
in general and public transfers are made in a compensatory fashion, this can 
be regarded as a “moral hazard” behavior.
The crowding- out eﬀect of realized public transfers on private transfers 
has been documented in the literature (see Kang and Jeon [2005] and Kim 
[2006], for example), but this potential crowding- out eﬀect of  a positive 
expectation about public transfers on private transfers is fi rst suggested in 
this study.
KReIS Regression Results
Since the KReIS survey asked about transfers that respondents or spouses 
received from and gave to coresident children as well as noncoresident chil-
dren, table 7.13 reports regression results on net annual transfer receipts by 
children’s coresidence status.21 Column (a) uses net transfer receipts from 
all children irrespective of coresidence status as the dependent variable, and 
columns (b) and (c) use net transfer receipts from coresident children and 
from noncoresident children, respectively. Therefore, column (c) results are 
most comparable to the KLoSA regression results in table 7.12.
In every specifi cation, net transfers are negatively correlated with the 
recipient’s income for almost the entire range of their income distribution, 
which confi rms that Korean familial transfers operate in a compensatory 
fashion. The crowding- out of noncoresident children’s transfers by trans-
fers from coresident children and others listed in table 7.5 also supports the 
altruism theory. Net worth is also negatively correlated with net transfers, 
although the relationship is not signifi cant for net transfers from nonco-
resident children. Parental education level exhibits a nonlinear relationship 
21. The unit of analysis here is an individual (or a respondent), not a family. Therefore, I 
estimate the model with clustered error terms to control for correlation within families and 
calculate the White- Huber robust standard errors. A household- level analysis using the age-
 eligible fi nancial respondents’ observations yields qualitatively similar results.
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with net transfer receipts from their children, which is also found in table 
7.13 of the KLoSA results.
On the other hand, net transfers from coresident children show diﬀerent 
relationships with some parental characteristics compared to those from 
noncoresident children. First, female respondents, household heads, or those 
who live with their spouses tend to have larger transfer defi cits from their 
coresident children, whereas they tend to have larger transfer surpluses from 
their noncoresident children.
Second, the age structure of household members has diﬀerent eﬀects on 
parents’ net transfer receipts by children’s coresidence status. The number 
of household members aged zero to four is positively correlated with net 
transfers from coresident children but it is negatively correlated with those 
from noncoresident children. This may refl ect coresident children’s transfers 
in return for their parents’ babysitting service because coresident infants are 
probably coresident children’s children, not noncoresident children’s. The 
number of household members aged ten to nineteen (and aged twenty to 
thirty- nine) in the household is negatively correlated with net transfers from 
coresident children, refl ecting parents’ substantial expenditure on teen agers 
(and probably single children in their twenties or thirties) for schooling, 
private tutoring, clothing, and so on. The number of household members 
aged forty to sixty- four is negatively correlated with net transfers from 
noncoresident children, which may suggest that the existence of potential 
supporters for elderly parents in the household reduces transfers from non-
coresident children.22
Third, noncoresident sons give more transfers than noncoresident daugh-
ters. One more son gives his parents additional transfer surplus of 250,000 
won, while one more daughter gives her parents additional transfer surplus 
of 150,000 won. But coresident children (“net receivers” on average) show 
no signifi cant diﬀerence by gender (see table 7.14).
Finally, more net transfer receipts are reported by those who are caring 
for their grandchildren (regardless of  whether they live together or not) 
almost entirely. Grandparents who provide extensive caregiving to their 
grandchildren get more transfer surplus of 1,981,000 won from noncoresi-
dent children (probably the grandchildren’s parents) than grandparents who 
do not. This result provides evidence to the existence of exchange motive in 
familial transfers.
7.3.3   Which Child Gives More to Parents?
Now I turn to the child’s side to examine the donor’s characteristics. We 
can also control for the donor’s and the recipient’s observed characteristics 
22. Those aged forty to sixty- four may include parents themselves, but the KReIS data do not 
provide more detailed information on the age structure other than these age categories.
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simultaneously in a cross- section model with a parent- child pair being the 
unit of analysis. But familial transfer behavior can be aﬀected by unobserved 
family- specifi c characteristics, which are arguably common across children 
within a family. Thus, to investigate which child gives more to her or his 
parents in a family, the best empirical strategy would be a family fi xed- eﬀect 
specifi cation using a sibling sample that consists of multiple parent- child 
pairs in the family. I confi ne children to adults (aged nineteen or over) and 
those who do not live with their parents and are not students at the time 
of survey. Considering potential diﬀerences in the eﬀects of donor’s char-
acteristics depending on whether the transfer is regular fi nancial support 
or occasional irregular transfer, I use three diﬀerent dependent variables: 
the amounts of net total/ regular/ irregular transfer receipts from each adult 
child in the family.
The main interest is how net transfer receipt is aﬀected by the child’s 
demographic characteristics such as age, birth order, gender, marital status, 
number of children, and fi nancial status. Since the KLoSA data do not have 
information on children’s income or wealth, I use years of education, home 
ownership, and work status as proxies for their fi nancial status. In addition, 
I use variables related to intimacy in the relationship between the respondent 
and each child. These variables are the child’s residential distance from the 
respondent; frequency of contact in person and by phone, mail, or e- mail; 
and receipts and gifts of various in- kind transfers. One may have interest in 
how in- kind transfer variables are related to fi nancial transfers.
Table 7.15 reports regression results from these within- family estimations. 
To account for the potential relationship of in- kind transfers with net fi nan-
cial transfers, I include dummies for in- kind transfer gift and receipt in 
specifi cation (a), and then dummies for detailed items of in- kind transfer 
gift and receipt in specifi cation (b).
Children’s demographic variables exhibit some interesting relationships, 
with net transfers given to their parents. First, the eldest child in the family 
gives more net regular fi nancial support to the parents by 230,000 won per 
year. Similarly, the son gives more by 230,000 won per year than the daugh-
ter. Thus, both estimates imply that the eldest son makes more transfers 
than his siblings on a regular base by 460,000 won per year. This refl ects 
an old tradition that the eldest son usually undertakes the responsibility 
to support his elderly parents and inherits their property (and also the 
duty of  celebrating annual Confucian memorial services for his ancestors) 
afterwards.
Second, a more educated child gives more total transfer surplus to the 
parent by 90,000 won per additional one year of  education. Looking at 
regular transfer only, additional transfer surplus from the child’s one 
more year of  education is 65,000 won per year. Irregular transfer surplus 
from child education does not have any statistical signifi cance in every 
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specifi cation.23 In addition, when a college graduate dummy is included 
instead of  years of  education, total (regular) transfer surplus from the 
child’s college graduation is 430,000 won (260,000 won) per year. There-
fore, a college- graduate child gives more net regular transfers than her/ his 
siblings who have not graduated from college by only 20,000 won (roughly 20 
dollars) per month. If  children’s education has been funded mainly by their 
parents, this “repayment” looks too small.24 In light of this, child education 
can hardly be a retirement plan for the parents.
Third, a child who has her or his own home makes a larger amount of 
regular transfer (by 340,000 won per year) than siblings who do not have 
home ownership. Since the 2006 KLoSA data have no information on chil-
dren’s income or assets other than home, home ownership can be used as 
a reliable proxy for the economic standing of the child. This result seems 
trivial, but consistent with the theory that transfers are increasing in the 
donor’s pretransfer income.
Fourth, when we look at total transfers, the child’s work status does not 
seem to be related with transfer behavior. However, looking at regular trans-
fers and irregular transfers separately, we can fi nd an interesting pattern of 
transfer behavior by the child’s work status. A child who has a job makes 
more regular transfers by 310,000 won per year than her or his sibling who 
has no job. But the latter makes more irregular transfers than the former by 
the similar amount, which leads to roughly the same amount of resultant 
total transfers regardless of the child’s work status.
Fifth, a child who is currently married makes more regular transfers than 
a child who is still single. A child with other marital status does not show 
any signifi cant diﬀerence compared with an unmarried child.
Sixth, parents seem to have the least fi nancial gain from a child who lives 
within a one- hour distance (by public transportation) than other children 
living closer or farther. The frequency of a child’s face- to- face contact or 
phone/ mail/ e- mail contact with the respondent does not show any signifi -
cant relationship with transfer behavior.25
23. Although not provided in this chapter, the specifi cation that includes the square term of 
years of education is estimated with statistical signifi cance only for the model of net regular 
transfer. The estimated quadratic function of net regular transfer is increasing in the years of 
education higher than 11.5 years. But 83.5 percent of the children in the regression sample have 
at least twelve years of education, so in most cases net transfers from children are positively 
correlated with their education levels.
24. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s) 
Education at a Glance 2007, annual expenditure per student on public education in Korea 
as of  2004 was estimated as 4,490 dollars for primary education, 6,761 dollars for second-
ary education, and 7,068 dollars for tertiary education. Furthermore, it is well- known that 
Korean parents spend large sums of money on the private tutoring for their children. As of 
2007, average monthly spending per student on private tutoring is estimated by 276 dollars for 
primary school, 338 dollars for middle school, and 386 dollars for high school (Korea National 
Statistical Oﬃce, February 2008).
25. At the beginning of my estimation, a regression using the entire KLoSA children sample 
showed that a child who had never contacted the respondent in person made a signifi cantly 
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Finally, parents receive a larger amount of  net irregular transfer from 
children whom they gave some in- kind transfers than from other children 
whom they did not. If  this is because parents gave a smaller amount of 
irregular fi nancial help to the child who received some in- kind transfers, 
the relationship implies that in- kind transfer and irregular fi nancial transfer 
are substitutes. Instead, if  this is because the child gave a greater amount of 
irregular fi nancial help to the parents, the relationship implies that children’s 
occasional fi nancial transfers are made in return for the in- kind transfers 
received from their parents. Specifi cation (b) examines what type of in- kind 
transfers are related to fi nancial transfers. The results show that a child who 
provides parents with a leisure gift such as travel gift certifi cates is probably 
a regular fi nancial helper to the parents. In addition, a child’s occasional 
fi nancial transfer is made probably in return for a parental gift of health-
 related products.
The KReIS data do not have any information on the respondents’ children 
except the number of sons and daughters. But the KReIS survey contains 
a useful question for this study, which reads: “Which child is providing the 
biggest fi nancial help to you with nothing in return?” To this question, the 
respondent reports the birth order and gender of the child so that we can 
identify the major fi nancial supporter’s birth order and gender. Table 7.16 
summarizes the best information that can be drawn from the data. We fi nd 
again a dominant role of the eldest son in supporting elderly parents. At 
least 42 percent of KReIS households pinpoint their eldest sons as major 
fi nancial supporters.
7.4   Deteriorating Familial Support and Policies for Old- Age Security
The tradition of familial support for the elderly in Korea is on a decreasing 
turn due to broadly documented socioeconomic factors such as nuclear fam-
larger transfer than other children who had been in some contact. But this result was driven by 
an extreme outlier who made a huge amount of net transfer (43,200,000 won a year), which I 
have dropped from the sample.
Table 7.16 Major fi nancial supporter among children: KReIS data (%)
Eldest son  42.4 (53.6)  Other children  46.4
Firstborn and only son 9.8 Other son 10.8
Non- fi rstborn but only son 5.5 Daughter with no brother 6.7
Non- only son but eldest son 27.2 Daughter with 1 brother 15.6
Non- only son but can be eldest son  (11.2)  Daughter with 2 or more brothers  13.3
Source: Calculated by the author using the 2005 KReIS data.
Note: All numbers are weighted using household weights.
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ily, individualism, population aging, and changing preferences for multigen-
erational coresidence. In this regard, the demand and expectation that the 
government should expand programs to guarantee the income of the elderly 
are growing. This section describes changes in familial support mechanism 
and discusses potential income sources of the elderly.
7.4.1   Changes in Familial Support Mechanism
Decreasing Portion of Familial Transfer as Main Source of Elderly Income
Familial transfer has been losing importance as a private safety net for 
Korean elderly. As shown in table 7.17, the proportion of Korean elderly 
aged sixty or older who report that their main source of income is fi nan-
cial assistance from their children has decreased from 72 percent in 1980 
to 56 percent in 1995, and 31 percent in 2003. Instead, the proportion of 
public transfers as the main source of income has increased, owing to welfare 
expansion after the late 1990s fi nancial crisis in Korea. As a result, a quarter 
of the elderly aged sixty or older was living mainly on public transfers as of 
2003. Considering that public transfers tend to crowd out private transfers, 
private demand for welfare programs for the elderly is likely to increase 
further.
Changing Patterns of Children’s Coresidence with 
and Support for Elderly Parents
This study focuses on intergenerational transfer as a pillar of familial sup-
port mechanism. But another pillar should be intergenerational coresidence. 
Coresidence implies sharing of food and utilities as well as housing, so it 
may be altruistic from the standpoint of the richer member in the family. 
However, intergenerational coresidence is sometimes demanded by children 
Table 7.17 Changing patterns of main source of the elderly (aged sixty or older) 
income in Korea (%)
Income source  Items  1980 1995 2003
Labor Wage, own business, etc. 16.2 26.6 30.4
Property Rent, interest, dividend, deposit withdrawal, 
  private pension, etc. 5.5 9.9 9.9
Private transfers Subtotal 75.6 56.6 31.4
  From children 72.4 56.3 31.1
  From other persons 3.2 0.3 0.3
Public transfers Subtotal 2.0 6.6 25.6
  Public pension, social insurance 0.8 2.9 10.6
    Public assistance  1.2  3.7  15.0
Sources: Kim (2006, Table 2- 13, 58). The 1980 and 1995 fi gures are from Seok and Kim (2000) 
who cited Japanese government’s cross- country survey, and the 2003 fi gures are calculated by 
Kim (2006), using the additional survey for the aged cohort in the 2003 KLIPS data.
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who need parents’ help for living. Anyway, relatively high prevalence of 
coresidence between elderly parents and adult children in Korea is generally 
interpreted as a structural manifestation of traditional family norms.
Although fewer parents are expecting to live with their adult children 
these days, some parents are probably curious about which child will live 
with them in their old age.26 Table 7.18 provides an answer to this question. 
Using KLoSA data, I investigate adult children’s characteristics as the deter-
minants of their status of coresidence with their parents. Again, I confi ne 
the children sample to those who were aged nineteen or older and were not 
students at the time of survey. To control for unobserved familial hetero-
geneity and also to see the results from a parent’s point of view, I compare 
the likelihoods of coresidence with elderly parents between siblings within a 
family using fi xed- eﬀect logit estimation (Chamberlain logit model).
Column (a) reports the likelihood of coresidence is high when the child 
is the eldest and a son, which refl ects a traditional norm of the eldest son’s 
coresidence with his parents. The positive eﬀect of the years of education 
of a child on the coresidence likelihood implies that more investment in a 
child’s education and resultant higher earning potential of the child would 
place more responsibility of supporting elderly parents on the child. The 
positive eﬀect of a child’s home ownership and having a job also indicates 
that elderly parents tend to live with children with better economic stand-
ings. The positive correlation of coresidence with the number of children 
of the child suggests that there is another motivation of coresidence with 
parents—taking care of grandchildren. The formation of three- generation 
households has been motivated partly by this instrumental concern of ex-
changing the adult child’s old- age support with the elderly parents’ child 
care service. Looking at marital status, married children are less likely to live 
with their parents than unmarried children. However, if  they get separated, 
divorced, or widowed, the probability of their coresidence with their parents 
increases again.
In columns (b) and (c), I examine the eﬀects of home ownership and work 
status interacted by marital status. Home ownership and employment raise 
the likelihood of married children’s coresidence with their parents, which 
shows again that the abler children are more likely to support their elderly 
parents. Unmarried children, however, are more likely to leave their parents 
if  they have a necessary condition for independence—jobs.
In traditional extended families, the eldest sons undertake the most re-
sponsibility to support their elderly parents. The regression results in table 
7.18 show that there still remains a tendency of the eldest son’s supporting 
elderly parents by intergenerational coresidence as well. However, recent 
26. According to a survey of Korean Baby Boomers (born between 1955 and 1963), con-
ducted in 2007, 69.7 percent believe that children should leave parental home after marriage 
(The Korea Economic Daily [Han- Gook- Gyeong- Je- Sin- Moon], June 18, 2007).
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socioeconomic changes in Korea are raising doubts about the sustainability 
of the tradition of familial support.
The 2003 KLIPS contains an additional survey for the aged (the KLIPS 
respondents who are aged fi fty or older at the time of survey), in which the 
respondents were asked who undertook the responsibility of  supporting 
their elderly parents. As shown in table 7.19, 71 percent of aged respondents 
report that the eldest sons lived with or supported their deceased parents 
while they were alive (question [a]), whereas only 45 percent report that 
the eldest sons are currently undertaking the responsibility of supporting 
their elderly parents (question [b]). Meanwhile, the proportion of the elderly 
taking care of  themselves without children’s support has increased from 
19 percent to 35 percent. Considering that the average age of the respondents 
Table 7.18 Which child lives with elderly parents? Fixed- eﬀect logit models, KLoSA data
Dependent variable: Whether living with parents
(A) (B) (C)
  Parameter  z- value  Parameter  z- value  Parameter  z- value
Age 0.016 1.69∗ 0.019 1.98∗∗ 0.019 2.05∗∗
Eldest child 0.190 2.33∗∗ 0.186 2.26∗∗ 0.177 2.16∗∗
Son 1.020 12.39∗∗∗ 0.872 10.19∗∗∗ 1.200 15.82∗∗∗
Years of education 0.066 3.55∗∗∗ 0.063 3.39∗∗∗ 0.088 4.80∗∗∗
Number of children 0.190 3.83∗∗∗ 0.199 3.98∗∗∗ 0.195 3.97∗∗∗
Home ownership 0.264 2.81∗∗∗
Working 0.323 3.72∗∗∗
Married –3.009 –23.02∗∗∗ –3.609 –22.24∗∗∗
  Married and own home 0.276 2.74∗∗∗
  Married and working 0.762 6.35∗∗∗
Separated –0.712 –1.65∗ –1.843 –3.00∗∗∗ 1.149 1.84∗
  Separated and own home –0.138 –0.10 0.204 0.14
  Separated and working 2.368 2.58∗∗∗ 2.365 2.51∗∗
Divorced –0.519 –2.55∗∗ –0.863 –2.75∗∗∗ 2.164 6.93∗∗∗
  Divorced and own home –0.229 –0.50 –0.264 –0.57
  Divorced and working 0.600 1.61 0.567 1.48
Widowed –1.328 –4.77∗∗∗ –1.556 –3.89∗∗∗ 1.580 4.10∗∗∗
  Widowed and own home –0.369 –0.73 –0.448 –0.87
  Widowed and working 0.544 1.12 0.482 0.97
Single 3.366 19.20∗∗∗
  Single and own home –0.244 –0.86
  Single and working –0.529 –3.44∗∗∗
Number of observations 7,164 7,164 7,164
Log likelihood –1,631.7 –1,609.0 –1,632.1
Pseudo R2  0.343    0.352    0.342   
∗∗∗Signifi cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signifi cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
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whose parents are still alive must be lower than that of  the respondents 
whose parents have died, we can infer that traditional norms of the eldest 
son’s responsibility to support his elderly parents have been deteriorating 
and that the responsibility has been shifting to the elderly themselves.27
7.4.2   Policies for Old- Age Income Security
As seen before, Korean elderly have been undertaking more responsibili-
ties for their income security. Do they have adequate means to do that? I 
briefl y describe their incomes and wealth by age and by income quintile to 
fi nd potential ways to old- age security.
The 2005 KReIS and the 2006 KLoSA have a fairly comprehensive set of 
data items on the respondent’s assets and debts as well as detailed compo-
nents of annual income. In particular, the availability of household wealth 
data is good news for researchers given the rarity of oﬃcial wealth data.28 
Tables 7.20 and 7.21, respectively, report mean amounts of annual income, 
assets, and debts by the KReIS and the KLoSA respondents’ ages. Table 7.22 
reports the same items for the KLoSA respondents aged sixty or older by 
their income quintiles. When constructing income quintiles, I exclude those 
Table 7.19 Changing patterns of undertaking responsibility to support the elderly: KLIPS data
(A) (B)
Coresident or supporter for 
the elderly parents  
Who lived with or supported 
your deceased parents while 
they were alive? 
(%, n  2,597)  
Who lives with or 
supports your elderly 
parents now? 
(%, n  799)  
Changes 
(% point)
Alone by themselves 18.6 34.5 15.9
The eldest son/daughter- in- law 70.6 45.2 –25.4
Other sons/daughters- in- law 6.5 13.8 7.2
Daughters/sons- in- law 2.8 4.1 1.4
All children together  1.5  2.5  1.0
Source: The additional survey for the old cohort (aged fi fty or older) in the 2003 KLIPS.
27. Although this study deals with fi nancial aspects of  elderly life, emotional diﬃculties 
suﬀered by the lonely elderly also cause serious social problems such as elderly suicide. As 
of 2004, 4,118 elderly people aged sixty or older committed suicide in Korea; that is, eleven 
persons a day. The elderly suicide rate has increased four times for a decade in Korea, ranked 
top among OECD countries. The suicide rate of the elderly living alone is three times higher 
than that of the average elderly. According to the 2006 elderly statistics reported by Korea 
National Statistical Oﬃce, 18 percent of people aged sixty- fi ve or older live alone without any 
family members.
28. The 2006 Household Wealth Survey (Korea National Statistical Offi ce, 2007) conducted 
by Korea National Statistical Oﬃce can be regarded as a starting point of collecting wealth data 
although the raw data of the survey are not available to the public. I reorganize the items of asset 
and debts in the 2006 KLoSA wealth data following the classifi cation of the 2006 Household 
Wealth Survey.
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who do not have any income from the sample. Of 4,159 KLoSA respondents 
aged sixty or older, 25.6 percent are reported to have no income.29 Table 
7.23 repeats table 7.22 for those aged sixty- fi ve or older. In reading tables 
7.21, 7.22, and 7.23, it should be noted that real estate and related security 
deposits could have been counted redundantly for multiple respondents in 
the same family, probably a couple, because KLoSA data report assets and 
debts at the respondent’s individual level, not at the household level. In table 
7.20, however, assets and debts are reported in the unit of  a couple (the 
KReIS respondent and his or her spouse, if  exists).
The 2005 KReIS survey classifi es annual income items and private trans-
fer income into the same section, so I add up these variables to construct a 
variable of total annual income in 2004. Missing and/ or refused answers in 
some income items are imputed with zeros. Using the 2006 KLoSA data, I 
construct a variable of total annual income in 2005 by summing up income 
items in the Income section, rent and interest in the Asset section, and 
private transfers in the Family section.30 Table 7.20 and table 7.21 show that 
total annual income decreases monotonously with the respondent’s age. A 
sharp decline of earnings is not suﬃciently compensated by supplementary 
incomes such as pension benefi ts and public or private transfers. As a result, 
the average total annual income of those in their seventies is below half  of 
that of those in their fi fties. In the following, I briefl y discuss how to make 
up for the elderly income defi ciency by examining each source of income.
Earnings
Tables 7.17 and 7.19 imply that an increasing number of elderly people 
now have to make ends meet by themselves. In this regard, one of the most 
promising income sources would be their jobs. Table 7.22 shows that the 
main income source of the highest quintile among those aged sixty or older 
is their employment, own businesses, or farms (66 percent of total annual 
income). For the highest income quintile among those aged sixty- fi ve or 
older in table 7.23, the proportion of wage gets lower because of retirement 
between age sixty and sixty- fi ve, but still 53 percent of their total annual 
income comes from their jobs, specifi cally farms. Therefore, job opportunity 
seems crucial to the income security of the elderly as of yet.
Retirement age has been virtually shortened since the late 1990s fi nancial 
crisis that has made layoﬀs easier and pushed early retirement. As a result, 
the employment of those aged between fi fty- fi ve and sixty- four has been 
declining in Korea while that in major advanced countries was on the uphill. 
29. This proportion of the elderly living without income does not necessarily seem to be 
overestimated. According to the whole population statistics based on the 2007 National Health 
Insurance data, 30 percent of 4,178,946 elderly households in which at least one person are 
aged sixty- fi ve or older are reported not to have any income.
30. Of course, private transfer receipts reported in the Family section are not included in the 
annual income that is used as an explanatory variable in the regression models of table 7.13.
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In Korea, people generally exit from their main career at an average age of 
fi fty- four and work for another thirteen to fourteen years at new workplaces 
with substantially worsened working conditions until they permanently stop 
working at the age of sixty- eight.
Now to postpone retirement in a rapidly aging society like Korea, system-
atic eﬀorts would be needed. For example, we may consider a wider adoption 
of the Wage Peak System to address employers’ concern about an increase 
in labor cost by retaining the aged under seniority- based payment scheme. 
And we may also consider a deferred pension and annuity system to give 
employees an incentive to delay their retirement.
Given that Korea’s economically active population aged between twenty-
 fi ve and fi fty- four declines from 2009, employment of the aged plays a role 
not just in elderly income but also for addressing a possible labor shortage. 
Stereotypical perceptions of employing the elderly, and the extent to which 
workers invest in their own human capital, are also factors. One option 
might be to facilitate employers’ investment in developing the aged- friendly 
training programs and strengthen self- motivated capability development by 
the aged workers. Elderly employment projects could also target more com-
petitive programs by tailoring job opportunities to each elderly individual’s 
need, ability, and willingness to work.
Property Incomes
As shown in tables 7.20 through 7.23, most properties of Korean elderly 
are real estates (more than 80 percent of  total assets), and the majority 
of elderly has virtually nothing other than their residential home. In this 
regard, the Reverse Mortgage Loan was introduced in 2007 to let those 
who are “house- rich but cash- poor” have regular income by liquidation of 
their residential home with staying in their home until they die. In addition, 
even though few elderly have stocks, mutual funds, or bonds right now, the 
proportion of fi nancial assets in elderly nest eggs will rise as capital markets 
are rapidly growing.31
Pensions
Public and private pension systems have a relatively short history in 
Korea compared to advanced western economies. Hence, the coverage and 
suﬃciency of benefi ts are not yet up to the level of a major source of retire-
ment income as seen in tables 7.20 and 7.21. Compared to the National 
Pension that started in 1988 and has not yet matured, occupational pensions 
have longer histories and higher replacement rates. Tables 7.22 and 7.23 
show that the benefi ciaries of occupational pensions are likely to occupy 
the highest income quintile among Korean elderly. Occupational pensions, 
31. An and Jun (2006) suggest that household savings for retirement are positively associated 
with household head’s education, job security, income stability, and housing security.
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however, cover very limited occupations such as public employees, teachers, 
or soldiers, in spite of requiring substantial infl ow of government budget. 
Moreover, the National Pension system is likely to face fi scal drain in several 
decades if  the current scheme will not be drastically reformed soon. A cor-
porate pension scheme that has been recently introduced is one alternative 
step toward a multipillar old- age security system based on public- private 
pension linkage.32 However, institutional rearrangements might be needed 
if  private pensions or annuities were to be used as a means of  securing 
retirement income. Tables 7.20 and 7.21 suggest that private pension/ annuity 
(insurance) application of the elderly has been negligible, although those in 
their forties and fi fties now seem to have more interest in that.
Public Transfers
Elderly households are far more prone to poverty. Using KLIPS data, 
Cho (2007) fi nds that as of 2005, 45.6 percent of households in absolute 
poverty are elderly households. Table 7.15 also suggests that the dependency 
on public assistance increases with age. Tables 7.22 and 7.23 show that those 
who do not take up the National Basic Livelihood Security benefi ts fi nd 
themselves in the lowest income quintile among the elderly. It is not clear 
whether they are indeed not eligible for the benefi ts or they are unfairly ex-
cluded from them; however, according to Kim (2006), who uses the 2003 
KLIPS data on aged respondents, at least 11.3 percent of elderly households 
whose heads are aged sixty or older are estimated to have been unfairly ex-
cluded from the National Basic Livelihood Security benefi ts despite living 
in absolute poverty.
The Basic Old- Age Pension benefi ts supposedly cover a broader range of 
Korean elderly aged sixty- fi ve or older—60 percent in 2008, with the maxi-
mum benefi t at 84,000 won per month. The growing role of governmental 
eﬀorts in assisting elderly income may indicate the overall improvement of 
Korea’s social welfare.
Private Transfers
Financial assistance from adult children still occupies a substantial por-
tion of elderly incomes. Table 7.21 reports that the proportion of familial 
transfer receipts in the KLoSA respondents’ total annual income increases 
after retirement to reach as much as 30 percent in their seventies. Tables 
7.22 and 7.23, however, show that the average amount of children’s fi nancial 
transfers received by the highest income quintile elderly is far larger than 
that of the lowest income quintile elderly.33 For the elderly below the middle 
32. To establish a multipillar model of old- age income security in Korea, Moon et al. (2005, 
2007) provides policy suggestions focusing on pension reforms and the development of pen-
sion systems.
33. Since aﬄuent elderly parents tend to make substantial transfers to their children, their 
net transfer receipts from their children are probably much smaller than their gross transfer 
receipts.
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income quintile, the average amount of familial transfer receipts is at most 
660,000 won (roughly 600 dollars) a year, despite the fact that familial trans-
fers occupy more than half  the total annual income. This surely refl ects a 
positive income correlation between parents and children. But it also shows 
that the anti- poverty eﬀectiveness of private transfers is limited because they 
are essentially income redistribution within families.
At least for a while, familial support will play a transient role as a private 
safety net for the elderly until a comprehensive system for old- age income 
security will have been full- fl edged and stabilized. As shown earlier, however, 
familial support for the elderly is deteriorating in terms of both fi nancial 
transfers and coresidence with elderly parents.34 Moreover, the expansion 
of elderly welfare will further decrease the role of families in old- age se-
curity. But, as Ogawa and Retherford (1997) point out, government seems 
unable to reverse the trend of a weakening role of familial support.35 Encour-
aging retirement savings through enhancement of long- term saving incen-
tives and promoting elderly employment might be options if  the government 
does not wish to support a growing elderly population.
7.5   Conclusion
This study investigates intergenerational transfers in Korea, focusing on 
children’s fi nancial assistance to their elderly parents. According to KLoSA 
and KLIPS data, two or three out of fi ve households provided some type of 
fi nancial support for their aged parents. The average amount of net annual 
transfers from children is approaching 2 million won after retirement age. 
Even though it is not always suﬃcient, fi nancial help from adult children 
has alleviated income defi ciency of Korean elderly.
Among many fi ndings from this study, I select four as key stylized facts. 
First, the negative eﬀect of the recipient’s income (and net worth) on net 
transfer receipt suggests that altruism is the main motive of familial trans-
fers in Korea. This is consistent with the existing literature that concludes 
altruism prevails as the motivation of private transfers until public transfer 
programs are well established (see Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez [2004], for ex-
ample). The exchange motive, however, also appears to operate in the form 
of more transfers to the parents who look after their grandchildren.
Second, as the theory predicts, as long as private transfers are made in 
34. A survey (conducted by Chosun Ilbo Co. and Mirae Asset Securities Co. in August 2005) 
of 1,001 Korean adults suggests that the current generation has an asymmetric view about 
the responsibility of supporting their elders and the expectation of being supported by their 
children. According to the survey, 47.4 percent feel they should support their elderly parents. 
But only 26.9 percent expect their children will support them after retirement.
35. On the factors that make Japanese government’s eﬀorts to shift some burden of sup-
porting the elderly back to families unsuccessful, Ogawa and Retherford list rapid population 
ageing, decreases in intergenerational coresidence, increases in women’s labor market partici-
pation and resultant decreases in available caregivers for impaired elderly, and depreciating 
values of fi lial piety.
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a compensatory fashion, they are crowded out by public transfers made in 
the same fashion. The KLIPS data show that there exists almost a dollar-
 for- dollar crowding- out of private transfers by public assistance benefi ts 
(Kim 2006), and the KLoSA data even suggest that positive expectations 
about public support also decrease elderly parents’ net transfer receipt in 
the family.
Third, intergenerational transfers in Korean families have been under the 
infl uence of traditional norms, specifi cally Confucian ethics that have insti-
tutionalized the eldest son’s responsibility of taking care of elderly parents. 
Therefore, even as of 2005, among other children the eldest son undertakes 
the heaviest burden of supporting his elderly parents through fi nancial help 
or coresidence with them.
Fourth, I fi nd that child education can hardly be a retirement plan. A 
child’s additional one year of education compared to his siblings only leads 
to an additional net transfer of 90,000 won per year for the elderly parents. 
Therefore, parental spending on children’s education can be an investment 
but cannot be the one for the old- age income security of the parents.
Moreover, familial support mechanism has been deteriorating in Korea. 
Seven out of ten Korean elderly people lived mainly on transfers from their 
children in 1980, but the proportion is only three out of ten in 2003. This 
gap has been fi lled with expansions of public assistance programs and an 
increased role of self- support. So the burden of supporting the increasing 
number of the elderly has shifted from families to government; and within a 
family, it has shifted from the eldest son to the elderly parents themselves.
In light of these fi ndings and ongoing changes, this study leaves some mes-
sages for households and government. For households, it suggests prepara-
tion for retirement. In the face of  rapid population aging and prevailing 
individualism, the social norm for supporting the elderly is changing from 
transfers to self- responsibilities. As such, individuals might have to consider 
longevity risk as well as keeping a balance between savings for their old age 
and spending on their children, and investing in their own human capital.
Finding an optimal role in the old- age security is a big challenge to the 
government coping with rapid population aging due to unprecedented 
low fertility rates, increasing life expectancy, and cohort eﬀect of the Baby 
Boomers’ imminent retirement. Possible alternatives include making more 
job opportunities for the elderly, enhancing long- term saving incentives, 
and pension reforms. In front of an increasing elderly population, political 
settlements tend to introduce universal welfare that covers most elderly 
people and generous benefi ts. However, considering that roughly half  of 
households living in poverty are elderly households, poverty reduction for 
the elderly may come to the forefront. In addition, before introducing new 
welfare programs, the existence and magnitude of latent demands for the 
service and potential crowding- out eﬀect of the program on private sectors 
should be accounted for and measured in a reasonable way.
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Comment Jiyeun Chang
Investigating intergenerational transfers is essential in order to understand 
the economic status and security of the Korean elderly. Previous researches 
and journalistic articles reported that they highly depend upon transfers 
from their adult children to live, although it is also known that the propor-
tion of private transfers among old- age income has been rapidly decreasing 
for the last few decades. However, empirical studies have been insuﬃcient, 
mostly because we lacked in data. Based on the new panel data, such as the 
Korean Longitudinal Study of  Aging (KLoSA), many empirical studies 
are to be expected. “Intergenerational Transfers and Old- Age Security in 
Korea” by Hisam Kim, although it could use only the data of a single year, 
makes a great contribution in our understanding, with detailed analysis and 
plenteous implications.
The most important fi nding of this chapter is about the motivation of 
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